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Financing of international collective action for epidemic and
pandemic preparedness
The global pandemic response has typically followed
cycles of panic followed by neglect. We are now, once
again, in a phase of neglect, leaving the world highly
vulnerable to massive loss of life and economic shocks
from natural or human-made epidemics and pandemics.
Quantifying the size of the losses caused by large-scale
outbreaks is challenging because the epidemiological
and economic research in this field is still at an early
stage. Research on the 1918 influenza H1N1 pandemic
and recent epidemics and pandemics has shown a range
of estimated losses (panel).1–7
A limitation in assessing the economic costs of
outbreaks is that they only capture the impact on
income. Fan and colleagues8 recently addressed
this limitation by estimating the “inclusive” cost of
pandemics: the sum of the cost in lost income and a
dollar valuation of the cost of early death. They found
that for Ebola and severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS), the true (“inclusive”) costs are two to three
times the income loss. For extremely serious pandemics
such as that of influenza in 1918, the inclusive costs are
over five times income loss. The inclusive costs of the
next severe influenza pandemic could be US$570 billion
each year or 0·7% of global income (range 0·4–1·0%)8—
an economic threat similar to that of global warming,
which is expected to cost 0·2–2·0% of global income
annually. Given the magnitude of the threat, we call for
scaled-up financing of international collective action for
epidemic and pandemic preparedness.
Two planks of preparedness must be strengthened.
The first is public health capacity—including human and
animal disease surveillance—as a first line of defence.9
Animal surveillance is important since most emerging
infectious diseases with outbreak potential originate
in animals. Rigorous external assessment of national
capabilities is critical; WHO developed the Joint External
Evaluation (JEE) tool specifically for this purpose.10
Financing for this first plank will largely be through
domestic resources, but supplementary donor financing
to low-income, high-risk countries is also needed.
The second plank is financing global efforts
to accelerate research and development (R&D)
of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics for outbreak

control, and to strengthen the global and regional
outbreak preparedness and response system. These
two international collective action activities are
underfunded.11
Medical countermeasures against many emerging
infectious diseases are currently missing. We need
greater investment in development of vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics to prevent potential
outbreaks from becoming humanitarian crises. The
new Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations
(CEPI), which aims to mobilise $1 billion over 5 years, is
developing vaccines against known emerging infectious
diseases as well as platforms for rapid development
of vaccines against outbreaks of unknown origin. The
WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics12
is a new mechanism for coordinating and prioritising
the development of drugs and diagnostics for emerging
infectious diseases. Consolidating and enhancing donor
support for these new initiatives would be an efficient
way to channel resources aimed at improving global
outbreak preparedness and response.
Crucial components of the global and regional system
for outbreak control include surge capacity (eg, the ability
to urgently deploy human resources); providing technical
guidance to countries in the event of an outbreak; and
establishing a coordinated, interlinked global, regional,
and national surveillance system. These activities are the
remit of several essential WHO financing envelopes that
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Panel: Health and economic impacts of epidemics and
pandemics
H1N1 influenza (1918)
• 50 million deaths;1 gross domestic product (GDP) loss of
3% in Australia, 15% in Canada, 17% in the UK, and 11% in
the USA2
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) (2003)
• 774 deaths;3 global economic loss of US$52·2 billion4
Ebola (2013)
• 10 600 deaths and a GDP loss of US$2·8 billion across
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone5
Zika (2015–16)
• 20 deaths6 and an expected loss of US$3·5 billion in the
Latin American and Caribbean region7
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all face major funding shortfalls. The Contingency Fund
for Emergencies finances surge outbreak response for
up to 3 months. The fund has a capitalisation target of
$100 million of flexible voluntary contributions, which
needs to be replenished with about $25–50 million
annually, depending on the extent of the outbreak
in any given year. However, as of April 30, 2017, only
$37·65 million had been contributed, with an additional
$4 million in pledges.13 The WHO Health Emergencies
and Health Systems Preparedness Programmes face an
annual shortfall of $225 million in funding their epidemic
and pandemic prevention and control activities.14
Previous health emergencies have shown that it
can take time to organise global collective action and
provide financing to the national and local level. In such
situations, a global mechanism should offer a rapid
injection of liquidity to affected countries. The World
Bank’s Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) is
a proposed global insurance mechanism for pandemic
emergencies.15 It aims to provide surge funding for
response efforts to help respond to rare, high-burden
disease outbreaks, preventing them from becoming
more deadly and costly pandemics. The PEF currently
proposes a coverage of $500 million for the insurance
window; increasing the current coverage will require
additional donor commitments. In addition, the PEF has
a $50–100 million replenishable cash window.
As the world’s health ministers meet this month for
the World Health Assembly, we propose five key ways
to help prevent mortality and economic shocks from
disease outbreaks. First, to accelerate development
of new technologies to control outbreaks, donors
should expand their financing for CEPI and support the
WHO R&D Blueprint for Action to Prevent Epidemics.
Second, funding gaps in the WHO Contingency Fund
for Emergencies and the WHO Health Emergencies
Programme should be urgently filled and the PEF should
be fully financed. Third, all nations should support
their own and other countries’ national preparedness
efforts, including committing to the JEE process.
Fourth, we believe it would be valuable to create and
maintain a regional and country-level pandemic risk
and preparedness index. This index could potentially be
used as a way to review preparedness in International
Monetary Fund article IV consultations (regular country
reports by staff to its Board). Finally, we call for a new
global effort to develop long-term national, regional,
2

and global investment plans to create a world secure
from the threat of devastation from outbreaks.
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